groups can help some governments avoid accountability for violence and repression. Our empirical analysis finds that weak democracies as well as recipients of financial aid from democracies are particularly likely to form informal ties with militias. This relationship is strengthened as the monitoring costs of democratic donors increases. Out-of-sample predictions illustrate the usefulness of our approach that views informal ties to militias as deliberate government strategy to avoid accountability. unofficial links to militias offer a means to shift responsibility for violence: "these forces tend to be more 'deniable' and opaque than formal government security forces, allowing the state to avoid accountability" (Staniland 2012, 17) . Beyond providing force, informational and deployment advantages to governments under the threat of civil violence, militias mitigate the risk of domestic and international liability for repression. 4 After presenting the argument and some case examples, we move to the empirical analysis. Our results are consistent with the expectation that these linkages are a response to armed conflict and disorder. But beyond this disorder explanation, the results also support the argument that unofficial government-militia cooperation reflects strategic choices to reduce governments' liability for repression.
Militias and Accountability
We assume governments may perceive important strategic benefits from the use of violence, if they can lower the perceived costs associated with its use. We know that even democratic governments are willing to violate human rights for strategic benefits, such as shifting unwanted civilian populations or ending a costly war and violent dissent (Downes 2006; Conrad and Moore 2010) . Rather than forego repression, governments may instead seek to evade accountability for it.
We argue that governments perceive ties to militias as a mechanism to evade accountability and muddy the flow of information about who is responsible for violence. Recent work has shown that militias increase the risk of state-sponsored repression (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014) . Accountability has two major components: information and conditional sanctions (Grant and Keohane 2005, 30) . First, accountability requires information on policies, such as repression, being available to citizens and the international community. Second, if there is evidence of wrongdoing, some punishment is expected to follow. These conditions, joint information and conditional punishment, help identify which countries are most likely to be held to account for violence, as well as which states might be best situated to use informal militias to reduce their liability.
Accountability, both domestic and international, is central to understanding governments' use of repression (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005) . We argue that governments seek to lower accountability for violence using the militia's organizational separation from regular security forces. This separation increases the problems of delegation. It worsens the information asymmetries concerning the implementation of repression, enabling the government (as principal) to claim it cannot control the militias (as agent). The separation makes it more difficult for accountability holders to trace the responsibility for violence back to the government. This process is similar to what Fiorina (1985) described as delegation to "disguise." Without being able to clearly establish responsibility for the violence, holding leaders to account, either by citizens or by the international community, is more difficult. This political incentive to use informal militias depends on the presence of domestic or international accountability mechanisms.
If our understanding of the incentives for government repression and the perceived usefulness of militias in avoiding accountability is correct, then we should see informal links between governments and militias not just in isolated cases where governments have yet to achieve sovereignty, but in many places around the world where governments fear negative sanctions for the use of violence.
One might question the likely success of this form of avoiding accountability, particularly when open source and media accounts reveal these ties. Yet governments often operate with a minimal view of what is required for denials. "The point is not to persuade audiences to agree with the account-that is, to support the action-but to make it sound credible and reasonable" (Cohen 2001, 62) . With regular forces on the border and available to invade or to interdict proRussian militias, such as the Vostok Battalion operating in the Ukraine, and despite evidence in the worldwide media of their supply of these forces, the Russian government persisted in denying control over the Vostok Battalion: " He [Putin] was trying to maintain an element of deniability, which he would be unable to do if he had sent regular Russian troops" (Judah 2014, 77 ). Grant and Keohane make this point: "in world politics, accountability for most powerwielders is likely to be less constraining than is optimal" (2005, 40) . Even flimsy denials of responsibility for the activities of "rogue elements" in these groups may prove sufficient to create some reasonable doubt about the government's accountability.
Information, Government Sensitivity, and Reduced Liability
Leaders' sensitivity to accountability for using militias varies with the government's ability to suppress information on links to militias, and with the conditional costs incurred if their responsibility were revealed. Governments may face domestic and international accountability mechanisms.
Domestically, democratic leaders may expect to be punished for using violence since democratic institutions enable voters to sanction the government's behavior with loss of public support or office. For example, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's approval rating dropped 10 points within months of cracking down on protesters in Istanbul in late May 2013 (Peter 2013 ). Leaders in democracies may align with informal armed groups if they expect to shift responsibility for their actions. Informal linkages to militias might be quite easy for all governments to keep secret, since even full democracies have the power to keep official secrets (Colaresi 2014) . However, in a full democracy with free speech and open information, secrecy is more difficult to maintain compared to incomplete democracies. This argument is in line with the finding that "full democracy" (Davenport and Armstrong 2004) , reduces violations of human rights due to mechanisms of domestic accountability (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010) . Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith and Cherif argue "limited accountability generally retards improvements in human rights" (2005, 439) . Governments in weak democracies are more likely to expect to be able reduce pressure to adhere to human rights standards by using militias to limit accountability:
H1: Informal government-militia ties are more likely in weak democracies compared to full democracies or non-democracies.
Leaders in strong autocracies have less fear of the domestic costs of official repression.
Information asymmetries in autocracies are more severe than in other regime types. They are unlikely to have interest groups and "fire alarm" monitoring (Banks and Weingast 1992 Aid from democratic countries makes leaders vulnerable to conditional sanctions, providing the motivation to seek ties to informal armed groups. But only countries that expect to get away with this strategy will take this risk. In countries that are difficult for the international community to monitor, informal ties might escape notice. Since accountability relies on the joint combination of potential sanctions and information, we explore the possibility that the use of unofficial militias increases for recipients of democratic aid as the monitoring costs of the donors and the remoteness from donor democracies increases:
7 Nielsen (2013) points to the political costs for donors seen to support repressive regimes. For donor countries with strategic priorities, but with human rights constraints on aid policies, pointing to the recipient government's incomplete control of those committing violence may provide some 'credible if not persuasive' defense of their support for repressive allies. Also, if democratic states refuse aid to countries that they expect in the future will utilize militias to repress their populations and avoid monitoring, then higher democratic aid should lower the probability of informal PGMs. The analysis controls for GDP and military strength, which might influence the likelihood of aid and of militia presence.
H4: Informal government-militia ties are more likely in states that receive aid from democracies but are difficult for donor democracies to monitor, compared to other types of states.
Before testing these hypotheses on a global sample, some examples help illustrate the argument. Serbian officials denied responsibility for this militia, but The Washington Post noted that "Milošević's control is tight enough over Arkan's units that they would not be operating on a free-lance basis" (Pomfret 1994 ; The Economist 14 October 1995). Despite the flimsy basis for denial, Serbian Security Service officials avoided accountability. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found that Serbian officials had aided the groups. But "it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that Stanišić or Simatović planned or ordered the crimes." 9 With a "credible if not persuasive" defense they were acquitted on all charges.
CASE EXAMPLES OF INFORMAL TIES TO MILITIAS AND AVOIDING

ACCOUNTABILITY
In addition to legal liability for repression, militias may limit financial liability for aid dependent countries. In Cameroon, Rwanda, and Kenya, pressure from international aid donors to democratize, combined with pressure from internal opposition groups, led states to use informal repression "to avoid criticism by donors for human rights violations, but also to regain control over the transition process by covertly suppressing political conflicts" (Kirschke 2000, 385) . In 1991, the United States and other donor countries pressured President Moi into legalizing opposition parties and elections were held in 1992. But as in Rwanda and Cameroon, the government shifted to "informal repression, violations by surrogate bodies such as hit squads, party youth wings and traditional leaders, against perceived and real government critics" (Kirschke 2000, 397) . Donor-induced democratization saw violence "carried out by nonstate actors, such as vigilantes, paramilitaries, and militias, who are directly or indirectly supported by the government" (Roessler 2005, 209) .
Governments collaborate with militias to shift blame and redirect the flow of information about responsibility for violations from regular to irregular forces. This is a joint or "collusive" relationship (Staniland forthcoming), not a "substitute" relationship where regular forces then "refrain" from violations (Cohen and Nordas forthcoming; Stanton forthcoming). The logic of delegation predicts increased violations and more agent-centered violations (e.g., sexual violence) where militias are present, and commensurate opportunities shift blame to these 9 UN ICTY http://www.icty.org/sid/11329 groups, but not that regular forces desist from violations (Mitchell 2004) . 10 The logic also predicts high levels of agent-centered violations with similarly ill-disciplined or ill-motivated regular forces (e.g., Bohara et al. 2008) . Examining sexual violence Brysk (2014, 6) says "the Congolese state … assert the problem is centered in militias rather than national forces," but she highlights the responsibility of national forces as well as militias for these crimes. The Syrian government recruited the Shabiha militia from its prisons in 2011 to take the blame for atrocities (Sunday Telegraph March 23, 2014) . But both regular forces and militias continued to commit violations according to the United Nations (2013). Publicity about government violations may bring tangible costs for countries in receipt of aid (Nielsen 2013) , or it may make it easier to support the government's opponents -a plausible concern of the Assad government and an incentive to outsource.
These examples highlight the use of militias to reduce accountability. Across the cases, governments complicit in militia violence were at least partially successful in reducing the costs of being associated with excessive violence. The cases illustrate the complexity of accountability processes and the moral hazard of international aid or legal interventions, which might inadvertently create an incentive to use militias.
Before we empirically test our argument, we analyze the claim that militias offer logistical benefits to governments facing civil violence and disorder. Under such conditions, governments might use irregular armed groups as a quick and cost-effective way of deploying forces or gaining information advantages (Alvarez 2006; Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger forthcoming) . In this "Disorder Model," we analyze the impact of civil war and dissent on the 10 While lowering the costs of violence for governments, these groups also have their own agendas, and recruitment procedures are likely rudimentary. They attract violence-prone individuals (Alvarez 2006) to an organization that lacks discipline, training, and compensation to properly manage the delegation of violence. The motives of individual militia members may vary, and normative commitments are likely to impact the use of violence (Paper 7).
existence of informal government-militias links, controlling for level of development and population size. This model provides a benchmark to gauge the explanatory power of our accountability-avoidance mechanisms.
Measuring Informal Government-Militia Ties
We test our arguments using the Pro-Government Militias dataset (PGMD), containing information on whether an unofficial government-militia security tie existed in a given countryyear (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013 Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013) . Since governments seek to hide links to militias, one concern is missing information. However, the sources used for historical coding back to 1981 are greater than those available at the time. We use data until 2005 in this analysis. 12 To illustrate we also ran analyses that dropped groups labeled "death squads" (English) from the analysis, shown in the appendix.
We measure the incentive and ability to avoid domestic accountability with political institutions.
Strong Autocracies are coded as countries that score -7 or lower on the Polity2 scale (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010) . Weak Democracies are coded as countries that score between 1 and 6 on that scale. Strong Democracies are coded as countries with the score 7 or above on the Polity2 scale. The omitted category is weak autocracies. We also include the underlying Polity2 index, which ranges from -10 to 10 as a non-linear term in a generalized additive model to check whether a more flexible functional form provides evidence consistent with our hypotheses.
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We measure international sensitivity with aid dependence, utilizing the AID 2.0 database to measure aid transactions. We code the purchasing-price parity adjusted value of aid sent from democracies (at least 7 on the Polity2 scale), to any recipient. We compute Democratic aid dependency as the natural log of the sum total of aid received from democracies as a proportion of the recipient's GDP. 14 To capture monitoring costs for the international community, we measure the distance (in kilometers) between each country and the nearest democracy. We follow Tobler's law, which suggests "near things are more related than distant things," and assume that informal government-militia partnerships that are distant from democracies will be more difficult to detect due to greater inattention or fewer resources. As human rights monitors specify, distance inhibits monitoring due to less dense informational ties that can reliably collect information. 15 Distance to democracy is coded zero if the state is a democracy or a neighbor is a democracy, using the C-Shapes data , and then logged. 16 We also explore whether proximity to a democracy and democratic aid interact to jointly make
As the GAM results make clear, small changes to the thresholds for the categories do not alter our inferences. 14 When log-transforming the vector of aid scores we add one-half of the smallest, non-zero value, since they included zeros. 15 See the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), as well as the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo, "Manual on Human Right Monitoring," Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, Chapter 6, pg. 7, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/nordem/publications/manual/current/kap6.pdf. 16 When log-transforming the distance to democracy scores we added one-half of the smallest, non-zero value.
informal government-militia ties more likely, given that if a regime does not depend on foreign aid from democracies, then the international community has less leverage, regardless of the distance to the nearest democracy. As distance may be an imperfect measure of monitoring costs, we use absence of media access (Norris 2008) as an alternative.
17 This indicator is only available for a subset of our observations, but provides a useful validation of our inferences using distance to the nearest democracy. The results are presented in the appendix.
THE EMPIRICAL LEVERAGE OF AUTOCRATIC AID
Autocratic states are unlikely to be concerned about repression abroad. Therefore, aid from this source is unlikely to encourage recipient countries to outsource violence to militias. If democratic aid makes informal government-militia ties more likely, as expected, but autocratic aid does as well, then this would suggest that it is aid and not international monitoring by democracies that explains the use of PGMs. If, however, aid from democracies increases the presence of informal government-militia linkages, but not aid from autocracies, then this supports our conditional punishment argument. We therefore include Autocratic aid dependency in our specification.
ANALYZING THE DISORDER MODEL
We first analyze the impact of domestic disorder on the probability of government-militia linkages. Then we compare whether our accountability model improves our understanding of the 17 We reverse the media scale to match the argument concerning monitoring costs. It should be more difficult to monitor a country with less media. The media scale equals the sum of per capita televisions, newspapers, radios, and internet users divided by four (Norris 2009, 3) .The correlation between the distance to the nearest democracy and the absence of media scale is .49. The results are in the appendix and are consistent with the inferences using the distance measure. 18 We control for the time since the last PGM presence using cubic splines in several specifications to measure potential non-linear deterministic trends in the probability of informal militia links.
use of militias. We measure disorder with current domestic unrest using the Cross-national Times Series (CNTS) data (Banks 2008 ) and code Strikes, Riots, Demonstrations, and Guerrilla attacks into a set of dichotomous variables. We measure civil violence and war with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data (ACD) (Gleditsch et al., 2002) , using Civil violence to measure armed conflict above the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths within one year and Civil war capturing civil wars that have crossed the 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold. Including both Civil violence and Civil war allows us to capture the effects of varying levels of violence within the disorder framework. Excluding one of these variables treats all non-civil war years as equal and assumes that civil violence and civil war have the same effect on government-militia linkages. 19 We control for Economic development with the log of real GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables and for Population, which is logged and coded using the Correlates of War data, version 4.0 (Singer 1987) . We also measure Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003) to evaluate whether an ethnically more heterogeneous society increases the likelihood of government-militia collaboration.
When comparing our hypotheses with the Disorder Model we rely on generalized additive models to allow for flexible functional forms where appropriate, as well as a flexible interaction between aid from democracies and the distance to the nearest democracy. However, increasingly complicated specifications with greater flexibility are more likely to overfit the idiosyncrasies of the data. Therefore, we compare fits using AIC, which penalizes models with more parameters. To have a lower (thus better) AIC score, the added explanatory payoff must be greater than the added complexity. Additionally, we investigate out-of-sample fits between the 19 We explored whether constraining the coefficients for strikes, riots, and demonstrations and also civil violence and guerilla activity to be equal improved the model. It reduced the in-sample fit based on AIC and the forecasting performance. Therefore, we use the indicators separately. We conducted joint tests of significance to analyze whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for some or even all of the disorder coefficients are zero, or whether we can reject the hypothesis that they are all jointly zero.
Disorder Model and the Accountability Avoidance Model. A specification that is fitting idiosyncrasies in the sample data, rather than systematic patterns, will fit well in-sample but not out-of-sample. We use separation plots (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 2011) to present the out-ofsample results and report Brier scores.
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Results
The first column in Table 1 presents the results of the baseline Disorder Model. Strikes, riots, demonstrations, guerrilla attacks, civil violence, and civil war increase the probability of an informal government-militia relationship within a country. However, it is only demonstrations, guerrilla attacks, and civil violence that have substantially larger point estimates compared to their associated standard errors.
While strikes, riots, and civil wars have smaller coefficients relative to their uncertainty estimates, this appears to be due to the covariance between these measures, as there is a similar bivariate relationship between these variables and informal government-militia ties compared to the bivariate relationship between riots and these unofficial ties. In addition, civil violence is present in all cases of civil war, so that the civil war parameter is measuring the difference between civil violence and war. These six variables are jointly statistically significant using a Wald test. 21 We can reject the null hypothesis that the effect of strikes, demonstrations, and riots on PGM presences is jointly zero at the .01 level. 22 Decreasing GDP also increases the probability of an informal government-militia tie, as does increasing the population size, likely 20 We also explored whether having a smaller military might make informal PGMs more likely. Including the number of military personnel per capita did not alter our inferences; the results are presented in the appendix. We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion. 21 The test-statistic is 86.82, with six degrees of freedom and p < 0.001. 22 The test-statistic is 21.41 with three degrees of freedom and p<0.001.
reflecting deployment efficiencies gained from militia ties. Our estimate for ethnic fractionalization is negative, with a standard error over three times the size of the point estimate. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) Substantively, the Disorder Model estimates how increasing the risk of disorder is likely to impact the probability of informal government-militia ties, irrespective of the incentive to avoid accountability. Moving from a low risk scenario where a country has a population and GDP per capita at the sample median and no riots, demonstrations, or other forms of civil violence, to a higher risk country with a population at the third quartile without increasing GDP per capita proportionally
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, and is suffering from civil violence, increases the probability of an informal government-militia from 2 percent (90% CI: .01 to .04) to 14 percent (90% CI: .08 to .22). These results support the argument that government-militia ties are more likely in situations of domestic disorder. As we show below, accounting for the risk of being held accountable for violence substantially improves the predictive power of our models. 
AVOIDING ACCOUNTABILITY
To explore our argument that militias are more attractive in circumstance where leaders have incentives and opportunities to avoid accountability, the second and third set of columns in Table   1 show the results from our Accountability Avoidance Model, with measures of regime type, the amount of aid from democracies, the distance to the nearest democracy, and aid from autocracies, alone (second column in Table 1 ) and in combination with the disorder measures (third column in Table 1 ), since we view these incentives as complementary.
DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY
In each specification, we find support for the argument that governments use militias when they jointly have the incentive and ability to avoid accountability for violence. The results show that the probability of informal militia ties varies with regime type (see Table 1 , columns 2 and 3, and Figure 1) . A test that all of the regime categories have the same probability of informal militias is rejected at the .05 level for both models. Further, with both specifications weak democracies have the highest probability of informal militia presence and autocracy (including the excluded weak autocracy category) lowers the probability of having an informal militia. 24 These results provide evidence that weak democracies have a significantly higher probability of having informal militias, and that it is more difficult to differentiate the categories of strong autocracies, weak autocracies, and strong democracies.
24 Because this set of variables is categorical, we cannot interpret the raw coefficients as representing differences across all comparisons, but only against the baseline excluded category of weak autocracies. The positive coefficient for weak democracies represents the expectation that governments in weak democracies are more likely to have informal relationships with militias than weak autocracies. We can also test the equality of the estimated coefficients to see whether other differences are meaningful. Table 1 , Model 2 shows that strong autocracies have a significantly lower probability of informal militias compared to weak democracies (Chi-square=9.9, df=1, p<.001) and strong democracies (Chi-square=5.2, df=1, p<0.025), but that the difference between weak democracies and strong democracies (Chi-square=0.02, df=1, p=0.87) may be due to chance in this specification. The GAM model presented below provides clearer evidence on this last point.
The analyses in Table 1 assume that the probability of informal government-militia relationships jumps across categories instead of smoothly varying with the underlying democracy index, and that we have a priori specified the jump locations correctly. This can be seen in the first panel of Figure 1 , which plots the estimated probability of an informal militia and the 90 percent confidence interval from Model 2 in Table 1 for the 4 categories (strong autocracy, weak autocracy, weak democracy, and strong democracies) by the Polity2 scale that was used to create the categories. Each category is assumed to have a constant probability of a militia, while changes can only occur across categories. Table 2 estimates three generalized additive models that allow for flexible splines to fit the data to relax the assumption of linearity on the log odds scale for democracy and other variables of interest. We include the underlying Polity2 index as a continuous covariate without assuming a specific functional form for the relationship between regime types and the probability of informal government-militia ties. 25 Because these models no longer have only one parameter describing the change in the dependent variable, Table 2 presents the joint significance tests and estimated degrees of freedom for these non-linear relationships (smooth terms) and the AIC for each model, along with any linear terms that were included. The nonlinear relationships are best presented graphically.
FIGURE 1. Probability of Unofficial Government-Militia Ties in Different Regime Types
The second graph in Figure 1 plots the estimated relationship and standard error from the GAM in the second model in Table 2 . The probability of an informal government-militia relationship rises steadily as autocracy decreases, peaking rather sharply between the weak democracy and strong democracy categories (near six and seven on the Polity2 scale), before dropping again as a state reaches full democracy. The AIC statistics across Table 2 suggest that the GAM specification is a better fit to the data even after penalizing the model for adding additional parameters. Only replacing the categorical regime variables in Model 3, Table 1 with the spline results in a reduction (improvement) of the AIC from 1002.6 to 995.1.
In this model, weak democracies have three times the relative risk of informal government-militia ties compared to strong autocracies and 1.4 times the relative risk compared to strong democracies, consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2. As expected, states that are most likely to be held accountable for official repression, but might get away with using informal militias due to incomplete freedoms of speech and the press, are the most likely to have these ties. This nonlinear relationship is consistent across all three models in Table 3 .
FIGURE 2. Predicted Probability of Unofficial Government-militia Linkages Depending on Aid Dependency by Donor's Regime Type
Note: Democratic aid is represented with a dotted white, autocratic aid with a solid black, with 90 percent confidence intervals. These results are for a country that is at the 75th percentile of distance.
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Our results support the argument that international accountability motivates the use of militias.
Aid from democracies should increase the likelihood of ties to militias and the distance from the nearest democracy should increase the perceived ability to hide ties to militias. Aid from autocracies should decrease the likelihood of these ties since autocracies are unlikely to hold aid Table 1 to the GAM results in Table 2 suggests that aid from democracies increases and aid from autocracies decreases the probability of government-militia ties. 27 Thus, across different specifications H3 is supported. Figure 2 presents the differing slopes depending on whether the donor was a democracy or an autocracy, using the coefficients from Model 3, Table 2 . 28 The dotted white line with the accompanying darker confidence interval maps the non-linear but largely increasing relationship between democratic aid and informal militia ties for a state that is very distant from a democracy. The black line with lighter shaded confidence intervals maps the negative relationship between autocratic aid and the predicted probability of informal militia linkages.
Across the models, distance to the nearest democracy is estimated to increase the probability of informal ties, but the variability around this estimate suggests greater uncertainty about its additive effect. However, the best fitting model (Model 3, Table 2 ), by AIC, includes the non-linear interaction for aid from democracies and distance to the nearest democracy (Hypothesis 4), measuring cases that have both the incentive (keeping aid from democracies) and the opportunity (less precise monitoring due to distance from a democracy) to use a militia without suffering international accountability costs. The shape and significance of this interaction supports Hypothesis 4. Model 3 in Table 2 includes a two-dimensional tensor product smooth of distance and aid from democracies. The model can be thought of as suspending a flexible sheet, rather than a flat plane, through the data.
The estimated relationship between democratic aid conditional on distance and the probability of an informal government-militia relationship is shown in Figure 3 in a wireframe and a contour plot. Both present the predicted probability for unofficial government-militia ties for a weak democracy with civil violence, median GDP, and population, based on Model 3 in Table 2 . States that receive large amounts of aid from democracies and are far away from the nearest democracy are most likely to have informal government-militia ties. The estimated probability of such a tie increases from .2 (90% CI: .1 to .3) for a state that receives no aid from a democracy and shares a border with a democracy to over .8 (90% CI: .5 to .9) for a state that is over 1500 kilometers from the nearest democracy and receives aid from democracies at the 75th percentile.
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This plot also shows that the relationship between democratic aid and informal government-militia collaboration depends on the monitoring costs. Along the bottom edge of the contour plot the probability of informal militia-government rises only gently from .2 to .4 as aid increases. At the upper edge of the plot, for states that are distant from democracies, the probability increases from .3 to over .8.
The lower AIC value for the combined models (3rd set of columns in Tables 1 and 2) , compared either to the Disorder or the Accountability Avoidance Model, suggests that the disorder and accountability mechanisms are complementary; they are both useful for predicting informal militia relationships. The lower AIC value for the combined model that includes nonlinear terms (Model 3 in Table 2 ) compared to the linear model (Model 3 in Table 1 ) shows that the flexibility of the generalized additive model framework is helpful in predicting informal militia ties.
Combining accountability avoidance with disorder measures substantively increases the probability of unofficial government-militia relationships. An autocracy with civil violence, but aid from other autocracies and not democracies, has only an expected one percent probability (90% CI: .01, .03) of having an informal militia relationship. However, a weak democracy, with the same degree of civil violence, getting aid from a distant democracy, has over an 80 percent risk (90% CI: .5, .9) of having such a relationship.
FIGURE 3. Incentives and Opportunities for Unofficial Government-Militia Ties
Note: Distance to democracy is measured in log km, and democratic aid as logged proportion of GDP, and response as the predicted probability of a PGM being present. The z-axis on the wireframe is scaled from 0-1. The other two axes are scaled from min to max.
OUT OF SAMPLE PREDICTIONS
Despite the support for the Accountability Avoidance Model in combination with civil violence, our flexible model might be over-fitting idiosyncrasies in the sample data. Therefore,
we use out-of-sample validation to further support our argument that it is not only domestic disorder and logistical concerns that motivate governments to use informal armed groups, but 30 The Brier score equals the mean of the squared distance between the predicted probability and the observed value.
We also conducted several robustness tests that are detailed in the supporting information. To exclude the possibility that armed conflict drives our results, we excluded all countries from our sample with a civil war at any point during our observed time period. This did not alter our inferences, as there continued to be support for the hypothesized relationship between aid from democracies and informal government-militia ties, as well as between these links and weak democracy. Next, we included fixed effects for region, year, and then both region and year to the specification in Model 2, Table 1 as unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with our independent variables might drive our results. Again our inferences across the models remain robust. We also reran each model using only lagged independent variables and arrived at the same inference with slightly larger coefficients in absolute value. 31 This leaves us with a picture of where governments are likely to collaborate with informal armed groups. It is not simply that governments use militias during civil disorder, but unofficial ties to militias appear in places where governments have some chance of avoiding accountability for their actions and an incentive to do so.
Conclusion
We have argued that there are political as well as logistical incentives to delegate violence to informal armed groups. Our theoretical framework specifies the conditions under which governments are most likely to try to avoid accountability by collaborating with militias. While research has shown that governments avoid using repression when they expect to be punished for the violence, we argue that governments not only decide between using or not using violence. 31 We also controlled for an alternative measure of ethnic fractionalization using the Ethnic Power Relations data. Our inferences continued to be robust to these changes.
Governments can also choose to shift responsibility for repression. Having ties to informal militias provides governments with plausible deniability for the violence they might commit.
Clearly not all governments use militias. Loss of control or 'shirking' in this policy area has risks. Countries that expect to be punished for using violence and that are better placed to hide their ties with militias are most likely to use these groups. We measure the chance of getting away with delegating to militias with distance from the nearest democracy, as well as the absence of media access. The accountability cost for repression is operationalized with dependence on foreign aid from democracies. Our results show that governments that receive most aid from democratic donors and are also furthest away from democracies are most likely to have ties with militias. Using out-of-sample predictions further supports our finding that domestic disorder and civil war are only part of the reason for government-militias ties. While governments are more likely to establish links with informal armed groups during times of domestic conflict, governments' incentives to avoid accountability for violence also play a crucial role.
The policy implications for the international community are twofold. First, this study highlights the need to anticipate unintended consequences of threatening to punish states for repression. Weak democracies appear to be using informal militias to avoid accountability for repression. Other work suggests that these informal ties to militias may make violence and human rights abuses worse (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014) . Second, to prevent government officials sheltering behind deniability claims, the government should be reminded of the responsibility to ensure compliance with international standards. Responsibility should be placed on the donor community to adopt as an explicit criterion in aid decisions a thorough assessment of the recipient's security sector and the use or past use of militias.
neglected element of the security sector. As others have suggested, the monopoly of violence within a states is not a given (Ahram 2011a (Ahram , 2011b Staniland forthcoming 
